China has been one of the most-discussed international topics during the U.S. presidential campaign.
VOA spoke with Rick Waters, former head of the Office of China Coordination at the State Department and deputy assistant secretary of state for China and Taiwan, about the Biden administration’s China policy.
Waters spoke about his experience dealing with his Chinese counterparts, and how he thinks Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump would handle China, if elected.
This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
VOA: How do you evaluate the progress made in U.S.-China relations after U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California last year, and do you see real, meaningful results coming from the meeting?
Rick Waters: I think we have to look at this Woodside summit as the culmination of a number of things that happened in the administration.
The first is that for the first period, Biden was focused on rebuilding the U.S. domestic strength and reinvigorating partnerships and alliances globally, and then from that position, dealing with China from a position of relative strength. So during that first two-year period, the U.S. China relationship was, in some ways, arguably, not the priority. It was important, but it was managed largely through leader level diplomacy, which, in China’s current political configuration is the most important channel.
And then we know what happened in 2022 circumstances around the visit of former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi [to Taiwan] led to a downward spiral, and Biden and Xi made an initial effort to stabilize relations that fall at their summit in Bali, but it only made it a few months, and then the surveillance balloon knocked things sideways again.
So, I think what we have now is a little bit more stable floor built around the leader level channels, a few modest areas where there is some common work underway, and a web of senior, empowered channels at the Cabinet level, including Jake Sullivan, who try to manage conflict and competition rather within bounds, within guardrails, to avoid the scenario of unmitigated downward spiral we saw in 2022.
VOA: Do you think a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is inevitable, or what should the U.S. do to deter that invasion?
Waters: I don’t think that conflict is inevitable, and I think at its core the U.S.’s interest is peace and stability. That’s what’s anchored the prosperity in the Indo-Pacific over the past couple of decades. The ability for commerce, for trade, for people-to-people flows regionally to thrive in an environment where there is no war.
And so, I think if we take that as our starting point, I don’t think that conflict is inevitable, but I do think that the U.S. and Taiwan are focused very much on the question of how to ensure that the leadership in Beijing never believe they have a viable military option and an acceptable cost. And if that condition holds, then I think it will fall to the diplomats and to the channels that exist between the parties to manage this issue carefully.
VOA: During your career as a U.S. diplomat, what’s your experience dealing with your Chinese counterparts? What are some striking and most challenging aspects or moments that left an impression on you?
Waters: I’ve been fortunate to deal with Chinese diplomats for the better part of 30 years. And what I will say is irrespective of what you think of China’s policy or political system, they do have a very professional diplomatic corps. They’ve got very talented people in the system. What I think has changed over the past few decades is it’s a much more disciplined system. So, it’s very difficult, especially in official meetings, for Chinese diplomats to move too far off of the established line.
So, I don’t think that we should misunderstand the level of talent in the system when we look at it through its structural constraints. But I do think that as China’s overall foreign policy has become more assertive, as you know, the leadership has talked about China playing a greater role on the international stage. It has gone through periods where the wolf warriorism, the change in tone from the podium, has characterized a different era of Chinese diplomacy than what we saw before.
But I actually think, in some ways, there are plenty in the system who understand the counterproductive nature of those tactics, and I’ve seen a little bit of a tactical recalibration over recent years in how they express their foreign policy views publicly.
VOA: In this election season, the Biden administration’s China policy has often been criticized by the Republican campaign for being too weak. What is your take on that?
Waters: We’re in an election campaign, so obviously you’re never going to hear anyone say that someone’s policy is too tough. I think that the honest reality is that this election is not really, in my view, about China. It’s about other issues. China is present, but if you look at how much it’s featured in the speeches at the Republican and Democratic conventions, there are issues related to China that are important, but I think we have to maintain that perspective.
Second, I think that the issues that, in my view, matter most to voters center around trade and a perception of unfairness, a lack of reciprocity, and fentanyl, which for a number of years is a problem that has had a direct relationship to the producers of these precursor chemicals in China, and so I think those types of issues do matter on the margins, but they’re not central to U.S. voters, particularly in the swing states that will decide this election.
VOA: For the observers in China who are looking at this election, how is Harris’ China policy going to be different than President Biden’s, and what awaits China if Trump regains power?
Waters: I think how this is playing in China is a very different story. But I think what we have to say at this point is that we’re in the midst of a campaign. So, to be fair to both candidates, what we should judge is, once they form their Cabinets next spring, how will they translate political positions into new policy? I think Harris’s team has expressed a general view that her policy will be consistent with Biden’s. The Trump team and President Trump himself have talked about aspects of the relationship, particularly trade, where they feel that things are out of balance.
VOA: Biden and Xi are likely to meet and sit down again later this year. So, what are the prospects and expectations for this meeting?
Waters: It’ll be a critical moment, because this meeting — which will be either on the margins of the G20 [Group of 20 largest economies] summit in Brazil [November 18-19], or the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] summit in Lima, Peru [November 10-16], depending on where it takes place — these meetings on the margins of summits are consequential during a presidential transition. I think they can use it as a chance to help bridge between the two administrations. That will be easier if it’s a Biden-to-Harris transition, because Democrat-to-Democrat is more likely to be able to talk about how the bridging will work. But if it’s, you know, Biden-to-Trump, I still think it’s consequential.
President Biden can give his advice about how to avoid returning to the events of 2022 [and] how they can reflect on the lessons of what has been achieved since the Woodside [California] Summit [in November 2023]. And I think you probably go into it with fairly modest expectations.
