The sabotage incidents raise questions, however, about the limits of Nato’s power and the ability of the alliance to protect critical infrastructure and coastlines. What action is taken will be crucial in determining Europe’s response to Russian aggression, especially in light of a possible US retreat from the Atlantic alliance.
“We are as strong as what we are prepared to do. Nato has all the ability to show strength. If we are not ready to do that, Putin will not care if we call it a Nato lake,” says Landsbergis, the former Lithuanian foreign minister who is currently writing a report on the Baltic Sea. “The countries around the Baltic Sea are the most vocal, offering the most aid to Ukraine, but also the most vulnerable.”
Accidents or sabotage?
It is not yet known who is behind the three recent incidents of potential sabotage, nor the extent of Russian and Chinese government involvement and collaboration. Two of the ships were Chinese; all three caused the damage with their anchors.
Russia itself has denied involvement in each incident. An earlier instance of sabotage in the Baltic Sea — explosions on the Nordstream gas pipelines between Russia and Germany — is still under investigation. The most prominent theory is that Ukraine was responsible — but some European governments suspect Russia could have been behind the sabotage.
At least one of the vessels suspected of damaging cables in the Baltic was part of Russia’s shadow fleet — a group of poorly maintained and shadily owned oil tankers used to get around the west’s sanctions on Moscow. They are derided by experts as little more than “rustbuckets”, but together they transport as much as 60-70 per cent of Russia’s oil exports out through this key trade corridor, generating vital revenues for its war machine.
Some claim that Russia has little interest in drawing attention to these shadow vessels and the quantity of oil departing via its Baltic ports.
A person close to several of the investigations says: “I’m still sceptical about the notion that there would be intentional sabotage. The Baltic Sea is a crucial transport lifeline for Russia, both in terms of exports and imports. So why would it want to draw attention to the problems of the shadow fleet by engaging in sabotage?”
But others argue all three could not have been accidents or down to bad seamanship.
“It is impossible to drag an anchor for 150km without knowing you’re doing it,” says Landsbergis, referring to how some vessels have been accused of dragging anchors for long distances. “Your ship runs slower. You consume way more fuel. You would know. We didn’t have such incidents before the war in Ukraine.”
Markku Mylly, a retired sea captain and former head of the European Maritime Safety Agency, puts it more bluntly. “I can believe that one case could be an accident. Two cases in a row? Hardly. Three and more? Never, impossible.”
The Eagle S incident occurred just weeks before the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania disconnected from the Russian-controlled Brell power grid and joined Europe’s.