The war in Ukraine has dominated the political discussion ahead of three east German state elections in September. Both far-left and far-right parties are demanding negotiations with Russia and the halting of weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Can they affect Germany’s foreign policies?
“Peace, freedom, no war.” These are the types of slogans that ring out across the quaint cobbledstone old towns dotted around eastern Germany. The average age range of those carrying flags adorned with “peace” and “our country first2 is around 60.
But many of these protests also have darker undertones and echoes of anti-democratic values.
Some in a Monday demonstration in the east Saxony city of Goerlitz wore t-shirts that said: “when right becomes wrong, residence becomes a duty.” Some of the protesters are convinced the government is acting against them by “importing cultures” and spending money frivolously on green energy.
People from the eastern states of Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg will head to the polls in September. According to the latest polls, far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has overtaken in Saxony the Christian Democrats (CDU), who were in power for 16 years under former Chancellor Angela Merkel and who are expected to win in next year’s federal election.
New far-left party, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), splintered from left-wing party Die Linke last year and demanded similar policies as the AfD, such as negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the end of weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the watering down of climate policies. Both parties are highly critical of the current government, but haven’t offered many feasible solutions.
Could these eastern German state votes have an impact on the federal government’s foreign policy?
Political scientist Dr Carsten Koschmieder says not directly, although these elections could have an influence on the other political parties in power.
Koschmieder says the local state governments cannot conduct foreign policy, “but they do influence the overall political situation.”
The issue, Koschmieder says, “is that other parties are watching what’s happening. They see that BSW and AfD are getting a lot of votes. In East Germany, the war in Ukraine is a major issue.”
“What’s happening now is that, for example, the Minister President of Saxony Michael Kretschmer, who is a member of the CDU and who sits on the CDU’s national executive board, has been saying for months that we need to reconcile with Russia, buy Russian gas again, abandon Ukraine, stop giving Ukraine anything, and expel Ukrainian refugees.”
Koschmieder says Kretschmer wants to retain the majority of his votes, especially given that AfD could get around 30% of the votes in the September election.
“He’s trying to play into this issue because he knows it’s important to people. If after the state elections, it turns out that the parties opposing aid to Ukraine perform strongly, and if post-election surveys show that the issue was crucial to many voters, this will naturally have an impact on national politics. We have federal elections in 2025, if the coalition lasts that long.”
Koschmieder warns that “if the AfD achieves a strong result in the three state elections, democratic parties will start asking themselves why that is and what they need to change.”
“However, the influence of state governments beyond their borders is quite limited, unless they act through the Bundesrat (the Federal Council),” Koschmieder continues. “But even in the Bundesrat, the combined influence of the three states is minimal.”
What about a coalition between BSW and AfD?
The AfD is expected to be the strongest party at least in Saxony, and it is expected to do very well in Brandenburg and Thuringia. But it is unlikely that it will win over the 50% needed for a majority to join the government.
Appointing judges requires a two-third majority.
However, even if the AfD doesn’t enter the government, it can still exert great influence, according to Koschmieder.
Whilst the CDU has ruled out forming a coalition with AfD on both local and federal levels, they could potentially backtrack on this promise.
Alternatively, Koschmieder says, “it’s possible that, for example, the BSW and the AfD could together get more than 50% in one of the federal states. Then it would be impossible to form a government without one of these two parties, and they could of course make very strong demands during negotiations, saying, ‘We will only join the government if you agree to this or that.'”
Such demands would likely include the halting of weapons deliveries to Ukraine.
Koschmieder says it’s possible the BSW would enter the government and that leader Sahra Wagenknecht “has already said that she would intervene in the negotiations at the state level, and push for national and foreign policy issues to be part of the talks. She could say: ‘We’ll only enter a coalition if the coalition agreement includes the commitment that the state government advocates for certain things. Even though state governments don’t have any authority over foreign policy or decisions on aid or arms for Ukraine, she could still push for something like a Bundesrat initiative stating that Germany should stop supplying weapons to Ukraine. That’s actually likely.”
However, if there are disagreements within a coalition, the Bundesrat abstains from voting on issues. This means that the AfD, in coalition with another party like the CDU or BSW, wouldn’t vote on certain issues, even if all three states were ruled by an AfD government, which Koschmieder reckons is very unlikely.
Is the AfD truly a threat?
Koschmieder says that “the AfD will only have influence if other parties form a coalition with them or if the CDU adopt the AfD’s positions. In that case, the AfD could have a lasting negative impact on democracy. But if the CDU doesn’t do this, then the AfD will remain relatively isolated. Even if they get 30% of the vote, they won’t be able to cause much damage on their own.”
However, that’s only on a federal level. On a state level, the AfD could potentially “cause a lot of harm within their states, damaging democracy on a regional level, undermining education, and wrecking political engagement.”
Both the BSW and AfD are sceptical of green energy, but if AfD perform well in the upcoming elections, its leaders “might delay the coal phase-out because they don’t want to risk unemployment or structural changes in the East German coal regions. This affects all of Europe because if Germany continues to burn coal, or alternatively, invests more in solar and wind energy, this will have broader repercussions across the continent.”