THE ENDGAME FOR YOON
There are several endgame scenarios now, most of them turning on how Mr Yoon’s legislative allies respond to the mounting political pressure.
First, he might hang on by effectively turning over his presidency to his legislative partners. Mr Yoon gave a brief speech several hours before the vote on Saturday offering just that. He offered to allow his allied political party in the National Assembly – the conservative PPP – to set policy in his stead.
This is likely bait to keep PPP legislators from voting for his removal. If they think they will run the country, with Mr Yoon relegated to a curious caretaker role, perhaps they will retain him. Mr Yoon is probably making such a huge concession, because he fears prosecution and jail time. A South Korean president removed by impeachment in 2017 went to prison. If removed, Mr Yoon likely will too.
Another possibility is that Mr Yoon resigns, perhaps as part of a non-prosecution quid pro quo. This was the informal bargain which convinced US president Richard Nixon to resign in 1974, when he faced likely impeachment over the Watergate scandal. Mr Nixon would probably have been convicted; he faced jail time. To forestall that, he left office voluntarily, and his successor pardoned him. Mr Yoon might go for such a deal, but it is unclear if he trusts the opposition enough to not prosecute him if he leaves.
A final possibility, at the edges of the debate, is constitutional revision. South Korea’s president currently serves one five-year term. South Korean political science has long argued that the country should move to the US presidential system of two four-year terms. If enacted, Mr Yoon’s term would end in May 2026, not May 2027.
The appeal of this option is that it sidesteps the political machinations of the legislature and avoids a second impeachment of a South Korean president in just eight years. It is an unhealthy precedent for a democracy to regularly impeach its chief executive.
