As the West remains preoccupied with the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, Iran is seizing the moment to extend its influence into the South Caucasus — a region where age-old rivalries are being revived.
In late May, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze found himself at the center of controversy when he attended the funeral of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Among those who attended the ceremony was Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader who was assassinated in Iran’s capital Tehran on August 31.
Following Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash, Mohammad Mokhber was named Iran’s interim president. In late July, Masoud Pezeshkian was elected Iran’s president after being officially endorsed by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
According to Janatan Sayeh, a research analyst at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), while Kobakhidze aims to maintain basic diplomatic ties by attending events such as Raisi’s funeral, he faces reputational risks by associating with figures from designated terrorist organizations such as Hamas.
“The intent behind this was to maintain diplomatic ties and support Iran’s new president on a very basic level,” Sayeh told VOA Georgian. “However, it is questionable for them to be attending the same meeting as terrorists such as the PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] or Hamas or delegates from Hezbollah. So, it is a reputational challenge for many of these countries.”
The Georgian president’s appearance at Raisi’s funeral, which may have been in part a deliberate snub of Washington following U.S. criticism of his administration, was also an indication that Iran’s ambitions are no longer solely confined to the Middle East. Indeed, Iran’s increased attention to the South Caucasus reveals a strategic attempt to advance its rivalries with Turkey and Israel.
“Iran has definitely escalated its presence and influence in the Caucasus,” Sayeh said. “It does try its best to play a balancing act between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”
A complex history
The South Caucasus was a battleground for the Ottoman, Persian and Russian empires and, because of the region’s complex history, it remains a target of competing interests where strategic alliances are a necessity.
“Armenia and Azerbaijan are doing the same thing in their own different styles, trying to manage relations with Iran, Russia and Turkey,” said Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank.
“It’s a multi-vector hedging policy,” she told VOA.
In this complicated web of alliances, the bitter rivalry between Iran and Israel also plays a role. For years, Israel has been a primary supplier of military equipment to Azerbaijan, alongside Turkey. In return, Azerbaijan provides Israel with 40% of its oil needs.
On the other side, Iran, through its ties to certain religious institutions within Azerbaijan and its support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, “does pose a direct threat to Azerbaijan’s borders,” said FDD’s Sayeh.
“Azerbaijan is in a tough situation,” he said. “But in case situations were to escalate, I think it is in their best interest to stay out of the direct confrontation between Iran and Israel.”
The relationship between Baku and Tehran is further strained by a large Azerbaijani minority in Iran. While Turkey and Azerbaijan have been accused of attempting to use this as leverage, “Iran is able to control all of its civil society, no matter the ethnicity,” Sayeh said.
Against this backdrop, Armenia, driven by its strained relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, is seeking to strengthen its ties with Iran. Unconfirmed reports that Armenia has purchased $500 million in Iranian weapons — denied by both nations — may indicate Yerevan’s desperate attempt to forge new alliances.
Armenia’s formal recognition of Palestine as an independent state further aligns Yerevan with Tehran.
“Armenia is the one that has poor relations with all these three megapowers in the region, except perhaps Iran,” Brookings’ Aydintaşbaş said. “And I think they don’t want to lose that advantage to Azerbaijan.”
Armenia’s quest for new alliances is a response to Russia’s diminished support during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia did not aid Armenia when it fought Azerbaijan over the region in 2020 and 2023.
“The Nagorno-Karabakh war paved the way for Iran to step up its support for Armenia,” said Sayeh.
“Given that Russia is so occupied with its war on its western fronts, with Ukraine, it has not had the military capacity or the funds to support Armenia like it did in the past,” said Sayeh. “This presented an opportunity for Iran to enter the Southern Caucasus with more intensity.”
At the same time, Sayeh said, Armenia’s efforts to deepen ties with the West are fraught with difficulties.
“Armenia has been trying to open up its military cooperation with the West,” he said. “But given that Russia has backed out and Armenia is unhappy with the reassurances from the U.S., it is likely that Armenia doesn’t have a choice except to purchase Iranian weapons.”
Georgia’s status uncertain
Meanwhile, Georgia — once hailed as the most pro-Western country in the South Caucasus — now finds its status uncertain.
“In the West, they don’t know the direction that Georgian politics will take,” said Aydintaşbaş. “There is a reason to be cautious until the [parliamentary] elections in Georgia [in October], hoping that the direction the Georgian public chooses will be pro-Western.”
Iran’s broader strategic goal is to diminish the influence of the United States in the Caucasus, capitalizing on the small U.S. footprint in the region.
According to Sayeh, Tehran sees opportunities to expand its reach and possibly leverage its relationships with countries including Georgia and Armenia to counter Western interests.
“As long as they can get any country out of the Western sphere or out of the Western orbit, it would be a win for the Iranian side,” Sayeh said.
“Tehran’s focus is primarily on where U.S. interests lie. And now, there’s an opportunity for Iran to perhaps use Georgia, use Armenia, and with the proper Russian backing, expand their access to the Caucasus front.”
Analysts agree that the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza will profoundly affect the evolving “great game” among regional powers in the South Caucasus, shaping the region’s future dynamics.
This article originated in VOA’s Georgian Service.
