The sudden fall of Syria’s Assad regime in early December has raised an important question: Can the 6 million who became refugees during the 14-year civil war now go home? Officials in Turkey, Austria, Denmark and Bulgaria have started publicly discussing plans to repatriate the Syrian refugees in those countries. Others — including France, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Greece — have frozen asylum applications from Syria.
Although the political landscape has changed drastically, many factors work against a mass return of refugees to Syria.
Our 2021 study of refugees for RAND found that most never go back to their home countries. Since the end of World War II, only about 30% of those displaced by conflicts returned home, even a full decade after the conflict was over.
To be sure, people are on the move in and around Syria. Since the start of the rebel advance, about 125,000 refugees have returned, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency. But 100,000 have fled, afraid of the new regime. One million more Syrians were internally displaced by the fighting in November and December. At the same time, Israeli military strikes against Hezbollah pushed half a million people to cross the border into Syria from southern Lebanon.
Toppling Bashar Assad does not mean that Syria is at peace. The 1951 Refugee Convention espouses the principle of non-refoulement — that refugees cannot be returned against their will to a war zone. Populist rhetoric notwithstanding, host countries that deport Syrian refugees would be violating international law.
As for refugees returning voluntarily, our study found that a combination of four factors shapes their decisions: the conditions in their home countries, the conditions in their host countries, individual preferences and international engagement. Right now, these factors don’t add up to a significant number of Syrians opting to return.
The conditions inside Syria remain unsettled. The group that toppled the regime, Hayat Tahrir al Sham, is still branded a terrorist organization by the United States and other Western countries. Although some U.S. sanctions have been loosened in recent weeks, the flow of desperately needed humanitarian aid into Syria is still constrained. While the group was already governing a section of the country, it now oversees a much larger swath of territory as well as a multitude of ethnic and religious communities, many of whom distrust it and fear its intentions.
External military threats add to the general instability. After Hayat Tahrir al Sham took control in December, Turkey, long mistrustful of the Kurdish-led forces that control northeastern Syria, amassed troops at the border and threatened to invade. Israel launched 480 targeted airstrikes on Syria’s military and other infrastructure. And the United States conducted preemptive airstrikes to deter reconstitution of Islamic State and Al Qaeda capabilities.
Many Syrian refugees will have no home or job to return to. Syria’s infrastructure is so deteriorated that basic services are woefully insufficient for those who are there now — much less for a large influx of returning refugees. A decade and a half of warfare has damaged 23% of the total housing stock, especially where the fighting was most intense, and thus where many of the refugees lived. The education system is in shambles, with 2.4 million children not attending classes and heavily damaged school infrastructure. Only slightly more than half of Syria’s hospitals are fully functioning. And in addition to the refugees outside the country, more than 7 million Syrians are internally displaced. Refugees will consider these conditions as they weigh a decision to return.
Circumstances in the host countries vary significantly. Some have come to depend on the Syrian workforce, and many Syrians are well integrated in their new communities. In Turkey, Germany, Jordan and Egypt, Syrian refugees hold jobs in key industries. The sudden departure of Syrian workers in Germany, for example, would worsen existing labor shortages in hospitality, healthcare and construction industries. The fighting in southern Lebanon, on the other hand, might provide a compelling incentive for Syrian refugees there to return home.
Individual factors such as age, gender and socioeconomic status also influence return decisions. Many Syrian refugees don’t want to go back to the scene of traumatic experiences. And roughly half are children who may have spent most of their lives elsewhere. Educational and job opportunities will be quite limited for young people in Syria.
Our study found that the return of refugees is most sustainable when the international community is actively promoting stabilization, reconciliation and reconstruction. But major international players are taking a wait-and-see approach with Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Syria, continuing to restrict aid, investment and trade for the time being. The United Nations has said that large-scale returns would be premature now, even as it prepares for an influx of 1 million (of an estimated 6 million) refugees in the next six months.
Given the challenges Syria faces and the rules of international law, the refugees who will be returning in the near future are those who do so voluntarily. The international community should set aside discussions of repatriation and prioritize stabilizing Syria for those who are already there.
Shelly Culbertson is a senior policy researcher at Rand and a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee Rand Graduate School. Louay Constant is an adjunct senior policy researcher at Rand.
